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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jesus Manuel Garcia appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Order
of Commitment. He asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State
to present irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence including two photographs of the alleged
victim, Mr. Ruiz Gomez, and the testimony of Mr. Ruiz Gomez' wife, Danielle Nylander, that he
was a good person, for the purposes of proving his "humanness."
Additionally, Mr. Garcia asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct which
deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see that Mr. Garcia had a fair
trial by appealing to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury. Mr. Garcia contends that
the misconduct committed in his case is not harmless.
Furthermore, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing
him to excessive sentences without giving proper weight and consideration to the mitigating
factors in his case.
Finally, he asserts the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$162,185.27 in restitution because it failed to give proper weight to his inability to pay and his
limited future earing ability.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 10, 201 7, an Information was filed charging Mr. Garcia with second degree
murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon enhancement.

(R., pp.119-20.)

The

charges were the result of his alleged involvement in fight at the China Blue night club. (PSI,

1

p.3.) 1 During the fight, two young men suffered stab wounds. (PSI, p.3.) One of the men,
Mr. Ruiz Gomez died as a result of his injuries. (PSI, p.3.) Over objection, the above charges
were consolidated with a related possession of methamphetamine charge. (R., pp.302-03, 30506.) Mr. Garcia entered not guilty pleas to the charges and the case eventually proceeded to trial.
(R., pp.122, 459-66, 489-20.)
Prior to the start of trial, Mr. Garcia filed numerous pre-trial motions. Relevant to this
appeal, he challenged two photographs of the deceased, Mr. Ruiz Gomez. (Tr. 4/2/18, p.93, L.10
- p.95, L.2.)2 The photos depicted Mr. Ruiz Gomez as he appeared on his wedding day and with
his wife at a 5-K race. (Tr. 4/2/18, p.95, Ls.14-17; State's Exhibits 1 and 2.) Mr. Garcia asserted
that the photos were not relevant and prejudicial to the defense. (Tr. 4/2/18, p.94, Ls.11-25.)
The district court denied the motion to exclude the photos and noted that they were admissible to
"show that the victim was a human being, which is an element that's been charged." (Tr. 4/2/18,
p.98, Ls.18-23.)
Trial began on April 4, 2018, and lasted eight days. (Tr., p.122, L.3 - p.1838, L.7.)
During the trial, Mr. Garcia renewed his objection to the two photographs of Mr. Ruiz Gomez
and also objected to Ms. Nylander's testimony about what a wonderful man her husband was as
irrelevant and overly prejudicial; both objections were overruled. (Tr., p.332, Ls.18-24, p.329,
L.12 - p.3 31, L. 18.) During closing argument, defense counsel objected to related prosecutorial
misconduct. (Tr., p.1734, Ls.4-5.) This objection was also overruled. (Tr., p.1734, L.6.)

1

For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as "PSI" and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
2
For ease ofreference, the trial transcript and transcript of the sentencing hearing will be cited as
"Tr." All other transcript citations will also include the date of the hearing.
2

Mr. Garcia testified in his own defense. He admitted that he was involved in the fight at
China Blue and that he caused the injuries to Mr. Ruiz Gomez and Mr. Rosales; however, he was
adamant that his actions were in self-defense. (Tr., p.1625, L.14 - p.1633, L.25.) Mr. Garcia
maintains that the video evidence from China Blue strongly supports his assertion. (Defense
Exhibit A.)
The jury found Mr. Garcia guilty of all of the charges.

(R., pp.572-73.)

He was

sentenced to unified sentences of life, with twenty-five years fixed, for second degree murder;
twenty years, with six years fixed, for the aggravated battery conviction and the use of a deadly
weapon enhancement; and three years fixed, for the possession of a controlled substance
conviction; all to be served concurrently. (R., pp.591-92.) He filed a Notice of Appeal timely
from the Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment. (R., pp.595-98.) Mr. Garcia also
filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence.

(R., pp.621-24.)

The motion was denied.

(R., pp.628-30.)
Mr. Garcia objected to the proposed restitution on the basis that he had no ability to pay.
(R., pp.612-17.) He was ordered to pay $162,185.27 in restitution. (R., pp.635-39.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting two photographs of Daviel Ruiz
Gomez and allowing his wife, Danielle Nylander, to testify about her opinion of Mr. Ruiz
Gomez' personality and character?

II.

Did the State violate Mr. Godwin's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?

III.

Do the errors in Mr. Godwin's case amount to cumulative error?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Garcia, a unified
sentence of life, with twenty-five years fixed, for his conviction for second degree
murder, twenty years, with six years fixed, for his aggravated battery conviction, and
three years fixed, for his possession of a controlled substance conviction?

V.

Did the district court abused its discretion when it ordered Mr. Garcia to pay $162,185.27
in restitution?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Two Photographs Of Daviel Ruiz Gomez
And Allowing His Wife, Danielle Nylander, To Testify About Her Opinion Of Mr. Ruiz Gomez'
Personality And Character
A.

Introduction
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to

present evidence that was not relevant to the charge in the case at hand. The State was allowed
to present two photographs of the alleged victim, Mr. Ruiz Gomez, and the testimony of
Mr. Ruiz Gomez' wife, Danielle Nylander, that he was a "very kind person", helpful, close to his
family, a happy person, fitness minded, and community minded, for the purposes of showing that
he was a human being. Further, assuming arguendo that this Court finds the evidence to be
relevant, Mr. Garcia asserts the evidence is overly prejudicial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The relevancy of evidence is reviewed de nova.

State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202

(2006) (citing State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632 (1997)). The district court's determination
of whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. This Court must examine whether the trial court: (1)
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
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C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Two Photographs Of Daviel Ruiz
Gomez And Allowing His Wife, Danielle Nylander, To Testify About Her Opinion Of
Mr. Ruiz Gomez' Personality And Character
Prior to the Start of trial, Mr. Garcia objected to the admission of two photographs of

Mr. Ruiz Gomez. (Tr. 4/2/18, p.93, L.10 - p.95, L.2.) These photos depicted Mr. Ruiz Gomez
as he appeared on his wedding day and with his wife at a 5-K race. (Tr. 4/2/18, p.95, Ls.14-17;
State's Exhibits 1 and 2.) Mr. Garcia asserted that the photos were not relevant and prejudicial
to the defense. (Tr. 4/2/18, p.94, Ls.11-25.) Specifically, defense counsel argued:
I don't see how a picture ofDaviel running a race with his wife has anything to do
with whether he was somebody that would get in a fight in a bar, what his history
was, it doesn't - it doesn't have any relevance.
And I think that the photo on his wedding date is, again, a reminder to the
jury that - it's a subtle reminders that - it's not - it's kind of the cumulative issue.
It's not one little photo that says one thing. It's you start adding up all of these
little things and all of these inferences behind it start to take over and become a
problem. And that's our concern with the prejudicial impact.
(Tr. 4/2/18, p.97, L.17 - p.98, L.5.)
The district court held that it would allow the photos and noted "I think that those are
reasonable photographs and the State's entitled to show that the victim was a human being,
which is an element that's been charged." (Tr. 4/2/18, p.98, Ls.18-23.)
During trial, Danielle Nylander was allowed, over defense objection, to testify regarding
her opinion of her deceased husband, Daviel Ruiz Gomez. She testified as follows:
Q.

Okay. Tell us a little bit about Daviel.

A.

He was the most amazing person you'll ever meet in your life.

[Defense objection and discussion at the bench.] ...
Q.

Go ahead, Ms. Nylander, tell us a little bit about Daviel.

A.
So he was a very kind person, somebody that was always willing
to help people at all times.
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He was - he worked - he did welding for a while and then after that he
was an HV AC technician. He was very, very hard working. He worked probably
60 hours a week. He took care of me like no one ever did.
MR. MARX: Judge at this point I'd renew the objection I just made.
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule at this time.

Q.

Were you close to his family?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do things together often?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you and Daviel have any children together?

A.

No.

Q.

Any plans?

A.

Yes I was - we were trying.

MR. MARX:
relevance.

You Honor, I would resume my objection.

I don't see

THE COURT: Overruled, but, Ms. Higbee(Tr., p.329, L.12 - p.331, L.18.)
Ms. Nylander then identified State's Exhibit 1 as a photo ofDaviel on their wedding day
and State's Exhibit 2 as a photo of Daviel and her after they completed a 5K race. (Tr., p.332,
Ls.1-11.) The prior defense objection was renewed. (Tr., p.332, Ls.18-24.) The objection was
again overruled. (Tr., p.332, L.25.) The questioning continued:

Q.
Now, it appears that he's smiling in this photograph [referring to
Mr. Ruiz Gomez in State's Exhibit 1]. Is that generally- is he a happy person?
A.

Absolutely.
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Q.

State's Exhibit No. 2, what is this a photograph of?

A.

That is photo of Daviel and I after we finished a 5K race.

Q.

Do you know what 5K race that was?

A.

The FitOne 5K?

Q.

The one here in Boise?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And was that something that you and Daviel liked to do together?

A.

Yes, we were both very fitness-driven people.

Q.

Okay. What are some of the other things that you enjoyed doing

with Daviel?
MR. MARX: Objection, Your Honor, relevance?
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule it and ask that you be concise.
MS. HIGBEE: Certainly.
Q.
What are some of things that you enjoyed doing with Daviel in just
a few sentences?
A.
We would go on hikes together and we would go to the gym
together pretty consistently.

Q.

You said that he was pretty active, so physically fit?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And involved in the community?

A.

Yes.

(Tr., p.333, L.10 -p.335, L.13.)
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Following her testimony defense counsel reiterated its prior objection and request that the
district court not allow any more testimony along the same lines. (Tr., p.370, L.7 - p.371, L.23.)
Specifically, counsel noted that:
Your Honor, I think- if the State limits the testimony to the perceptions of
Daviel while they were out drinking and out partying, I think that that falls within
the reason of where it would be. The constant questions about how he was like as
a person, how he was as husband in this case or a brother or a friend, it's simply
to bolster who he is. I think it goes to part of our argument related to those
pictures that we had at the prior hearing where the State is attempting to build up
the deceased as a fantastic person who was snatched from his family and friends
and really trying to inflame the passions of the jury against Mr. Garcia. I just
don't see that it's relevant.
... It delves in my opinion of the category of simply trying to distract the
jury from the evidence at hand and have more focus on who he was as a person
rather than what happened that night.
(Tr., p.370, L.7 - p.371, L.5.)
The district court upheld its prior rulings and again held that, "I think the State is entitled
to admit a certain amount of evidence that demonstrates that the victim in this case was a human
being and it's an element of the proof

And other than simply acknowledging that is true

organically, I think that they're entitled to demonstrate some evidence of his humanness."
(Tr., p.373, L.24 - p.374, L.5.)

1.

The Photographs Of Mr. Ruiz Gomez And Danielle Nylander's Related
Testimony Was Not Admissible Because It Was Not Relevant

Mr. Garcia maintains that the two photographs of Mr. Ruiz Gomez and the challenged
portions of Mr. Nylander's testimony are not relevant. Contrary to the district court's ruling,
whether or not Mr. Ruiz Gomez was an "amazing person" is not a "fact of consequence to the
determination of the action."

9

Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence
is generally admissible; conversely, irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. I.R.E. 402. Whether
evidence is relevant is a question oflaw that is freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,
228 (2008).
Idaho Code§ 18-4001 defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being ... " As
such, the state had a duty to prove that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was a "human being." However, this
element is satisfied by a biological explanation.

It is intended to insure that a person has

committed the killing of a member of the species know as Homo sapiens as opposed to the
killing of a deer, rabbit, or other animal organism. This is an element that is easily proven and
was proven, in the case at hand, through other relevant evidence.
Evidence about the human being victim's personality or character is irrelevant,
superfluous information that is unnecessarily prejudicial.

For example, if evidence of

"humanness" was relevant and admissible to prove that an alleged victim was a human being,
this would open the door to both the good and bad qualities of a victim. In a case with a less
desirable victim a district court would have allowed evidence showing that the victim was selfcentered, careless, violent, bigoted, or just an all-around awful person. As, after all, no human
being is perfect and even the most appalling flaws are a part of humanity. Certainly, we do not
want juries to consider the value or quality of victim in determining whether or not a murder
occurred. Yet, allowing the presentation of this "evidence of humanness" encourages jurors to
do just that. The inclusion of the "killing of a human being" element was not intended as vehicle
to allow the presentation of otherwise inadmissible evidence.
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The district court's

mischaracterization of the element and what constitutes relevant evidence for proving a once
living organism was a human was erroneous.
As such, Mr. Garcia asserts that State's Exhibit's 1 and 2 and the challenged portion of
Ms. Nylander's testimony do not have the "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." Therefore, it was error for the district court to admit the evidence as it
was not relevant.

2.

Assuming Arguendo That Exhibits And Testimonial Evidence Was Relevant, The
Evidence Was Not Admissible Because It Was More Prejudicial Than Probative

Assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect outweighs any
limited probative value. Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 states that "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice ... " I.R.E. 403. When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the
evidence is not outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied.

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993).

Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 creates a

balancing test. On one hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of the proffered
evidence by focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the need
for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107 (1987). At
the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the evidence amounts to
unfair prejudice. Id.
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision based upon an exercise of reason. Had the district court conducted a proper balancing
of the probative value of the evidence and the danger of unfair prejudice, it would have found
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that any limited value was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice created by presenting
information amounting to an appeal to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury.
Allowing the State to present evidence that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was an “amazing person”,
“very kind”, helpful, close to his family, happy, fitness minded, and community minded was
unfairly prejudicial. It allowed the State to portray Mr. Ruiz Gomez in a particularly favorable
light and created and emotional appeal to the jury. Certainly a jury is more likely to feel
compelled to convict a defendant if the person who passed away was likeable and sympathetic.
In the case at hand, the challenged evidence was unfairly prejudicial because Mr. Garcia
was asserting self-defense. The jury was able to hear evidence that bolstered Mr. Ruiz Gomez,
yet there was no avenue to for Mr. Garcia to do the same and level the field. The defense had no
opportunity to present evidence about how well-liked and kind Mr. Garcia was; character
evidence that was available in large quantity, as shown through the letters of support submitted
for Mr. Garcia’s sentencing. (Sealed R., pp.745-802.) The idea that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was
considered, by his wife, to be “most amazing person you’ll ever meet in your life” likely played
a significant role in the jury’s determination of whether or not Mr. Ruiz Garcia and/or
Mr. Rosales could have been the initial aggressors and whether Mr. Garcia’s actions could be
justified as self-defense.

The irrelevant evidence served only to district the jury from the

ultimate question of guilt or innocence.
As such, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 and the challenged portions of Ms. Nylander’s testimony.
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D.

The Admission Of The Photographs Of Mr. Ruiz Gomez And The Related Testimony Of
Ms. Nylander Was Not Harmless Error
The admission of the prior State's Exhibit's 1 and 2 and the related portion of

Ms. Nylander's testimony was not harmless error. The harmless error doctrine has been defined
by this Court: "To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of
contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is raised, allowing the district court to
rule upon the issue, and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden
of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). In
this case, the State will be unable to prove that the admission of the prior testimony was harmless
error.

II.
The State Violated Mr. Garcia's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct

A.

Introduction
Mr. Garcia asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which requires

the vacation of his conviction. During closing argument, defense counsel objected when the
State referenced testimony admitted for the limited purpose of proving that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was
a human being for the purposes of appealing to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the
jury. These statements amounted to misconduct and the State cannot prove that the comments
did not contribute to the conviction.

As such, Mr. Garcia asserts his convictions should be

vacated.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Mr. Garcia's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional principles

and, as such, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). Because a timely objection was made in the trial court,

Mr. Garcia only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has the
burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho
at 222.

C.

The State Violated Mr. Garcia's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct
"[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement and a
safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due process."' Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Due process requires

criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978).
Prosecutorial misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.

State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005);

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the

prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The aim of due process is not the punishment of

society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
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1.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Appealing To The Emotions,
Passions, And Prejudices Of The Jury

Mr. Garcia asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when, during
closing arguments, it discussed State's Exhibits 1 and 2 and the challenged portion of
Ms. Nylander's testimony. The State did not merely reference the exhibits and testimony for the
purposes for which it was admitted, to prove that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was human, but to appeal to
the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury.
Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of
fact in a criminal case." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose "is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors

remember and interpret the evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450
(Ct. App. 1991)). "Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing
argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom." Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho
267, 280 (2003)). However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated
and those implied. Id.
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _ , 71 P. 608, 610 (1903). The
prosecutor's duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent
evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The
prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
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During closing argument, the prosecutor appealed to the emotions, passions, and
prejudices of the jury by stating:
You heard about Daviel in this trial. State's Exhibit No. 1, you got to see
what he looked like. And in the trial you learned that Daviel was only 21 years
old that, he had a loving family, that he grew up in Nampa, that he had a father,
Jose, his mother –
. . . That he had three siblings; his older brother, Misael, who’s two years older
than him and who he was closest to, a sister, Kimberly, and a youngest brother,
Brandon.
You also heard from his wife, Danielle, who they’d been married for one
and a half years. You know that Daviel worked as HVAC technician, that he
worked very hard, sometimes 60 or more hours a week and you knew that Daviel
from the testimony in this trial was a happy person, that he was friendly, that he
was often smiling, that he was helping others. You also heard about how he often
wore glasses as you’ll see in State’s Exhibit No. 2. You know that he and his
wife had been married for a year and a half, however, they had known each other
for much longer than that, in fact, going back to 7th grade and then high school
sweethearts.
You’ll also know that Daviel was active, that he was -- enjoyed doing
things with his family, that he enjoyed hiking, running.
(Tr., p.1733, L.23 – p.1735, L.2.)
Defense counsel objected to the above statements on the basis that the statements were
“going to the passions of the jury.”

(Tr., p.1734, Ls.4-5.)

The objection was overruled.

(Tr., p.1734, L.6.)
The exhibits and testimony were only admitted for the purposes of showing Mr. Ruiz
Gomez’ “humanness,” specifically to prove he was human being. (Tr. 4/2/18, p.98, Ls.18-23,
p.373, L.24 – p.374, L.5.)

Although it would have been proper, based on the district court’s

erroneous admission of the irrelevant evidence, to briefly mention State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 and
the testimony of Ms. Nylander, such reference should have been couched in the form of a
reminder that the State had satisfied its burden of proving that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was a human
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being. However, the State failed to mention that this evidence proved that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was
human and instead it appears that the above statements were offered for the sole purpose of
appealing to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury.
Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics,
are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho
891, 898 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844 (1982); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87 (Ct. App.
2007). The prosecutor's statements resulted in an improper plea for the jury to decide this case
based on its emotions, passions, and prejudices; namely, that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was a good person
and someone must be punished for his death regardless of whether or not he attacked Mr. Garcia
and the killing was in self-defense.
Because the prosecutor's statements were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a
guilty verdict based on its emotion, rather than the facts of the case, they were irrelevant and
improper and their admission violated Mr. Garcia's rights to a fair trial and due process under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, the misconduct also interfered with the jury's
ability to make an impartial decision, thereby interfering with Mr. Garcia's specific Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury. As such, the misconduct in this case clearly violates
Mr. Garcia's unwaived constitutional rights and deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

2.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Requires Vacation Of The Conviction

Neither misconduct objected to nor misconduct constituting fundamental error, will
require vacating a conviction, unless the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471 (2007); see also State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571
(2007). In the case at hand, the prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of Mr. Garcia's
convictions because the State will be unable to prove that it did not contribute to the convictions.
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III.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Garcia's Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived
Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Garcia asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless, the district
court's errors combined amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated,
show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due
process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative
error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and
then conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v.
Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even when individual errors

are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994). However, a finding of cumulative error must be

predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App.
1996).
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court's errors amounted to actual errors depriving him
of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found in Parts I-II above, and need
not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by reference.
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IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Garcia, A Unified
Sentence Of Life, With Twenty-Five Years Fixed, For His Conviction For Second Degree
Murder, Twenty Years, With Six Years Fixed, For His Aggravated Battery Conviction, And
Three Years Fixed, For His Possession Of A Controlled Substance Conviction
Mr. Garcia asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences are excessive.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '" [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Garcia does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Garcia must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing

State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138
(2001)).
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
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applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863. Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court failed to give
proper weight and consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in his case and, as a result,
did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Specifically, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court failed to give proper consideration
to his admitted substance abuse problem and need for treatment. Idaho courts have previously
recognized that substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be considered as a mitigating
factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).
Mr. Garcia began using alcohol and marijuana at the age of seventeen. (PSI, p.526.) In 2011, it
was recommended that he participate in Level I Outpatient Treatment.

(PSI, p.527.)

Unfortunately, his drug use expanded to include the use of methamphetamine.

(Sealed

R., p.717.) Mr. Garcia has noted that he will do "anything and everything ... to get the most out
of prison", is committed to changing the way he thinks, and has set goals for himself and his
future.

(Tr., p.1899, L.21 - p.1900, L.4.)

His willingness to participate in treatment will

undoubtedly be necessary to maintain future sobriety and to provide him with an opportunity to
achieve his future goals.
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial
court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999).

In 2010, Mr. Garcia was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and

Adjustment Disorder with mixed disturbance of emotion and conduct. (PSI, p.524.) He has
been previously prescribed Zoloft. (PSI, p.524.) He also has a history of cutting and suicide
attempts. (PSI, p.524; Sealed R., p.717.)
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Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court
noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court’s
decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Garcia has the support of his friends of
family.

He supplied the district court with an overwhelming forty-two letters of support.

(Sealed R., pp.745-802.)

The letters are heartwarming and eloquent. Specifically, he provide

letters from his uncle, Ramon Garcia; aunt, Mary Garcia; sister, Rosie Wright; brother, Omar
Garcia; mother, Maria Reynoso; aunt, Karen Draper; aunt, Alma DeArcos; step-grandmother,
Julia Chavez-Reynoso; step-father, Guadalupe Rito Reynoso; grandfather, Edward Medrano;
aunt, Irma Morin; uncle, Raul Garcia; uncle, Anthony Morin; cousin, Angelita Martinez; cousin,
Sylvia Barroso; father Jesus Garcia; step-brother, Armando Rios; brother, Marcos Garcia, family
member, Lupe Watson; uncle, Jose “Mike” Cariaga; cousin, Victoria Morin; step-cousin, Alex
Gallegos; cousin, Veronica Harris; uncle, Ruben Medrano; cousin, Frank Morin; brother-in-law,
Mark Wright; cousin, Nick Garcia; cousin, Brianna Garcia; cousin, Amadeo Morin; and stepbrother, Vincent Rito Reynono. (Sealed R., pp.745-47, 749-56, 759-64, 767-71, 774-77, 779-80,
783- 84, 787-88, 790-92, 797-801.) Over and over again, their letters describe Mr. Garcia as big
hearted, loving, hardworking, appreciative, generous, a strong role model, helpful, respectful,
remorseful, trustworthy, loyal, intelligent, compassionate, a good listener, religious, ambitious,
positive, independent, honest, responsible, and always smiling. (Sealed R., pp.745-47, 749-56,
759-64, 767-71, 774-77, 779-80, 783-84, 787-88, 790-92, 797-801.)

He also provided the

district court with numerous photos showing that Mr. Garcia has a close and loving relationship
with his family. (Sealed R., pp.722-744.)
However, it is not only family that sent letters praising Mr. Garcia. Family friends,
Juanita Morales, Lupita Hernandez, Aurora Paz, Ernesto Soto, Raquel Reyes, Norma Garcia-
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Barbosa; personal friends, Josh Davila, Scott Harris, Delia Serre, Andrea Hammons, Adrianna
Guevara; and his ex-fiancé, Jahvauna Smith also provided letters of support. (Sealed R., pp.748,
757-58, 765-66, 772-73, 778, 781-82, 785-86, 789, 793-796.)

These letters also describe

Mr. Garcia as smart, happy, fun to be around, caring, remorseful, kind, respectful, cheerful,
positive, loving, god-fearing, kind hearted, loyal, generous, and empathetic. (Sealed R., pp.748,
757-58, 765-66, 772-73, 778, 781-82, 785-86, 789, 793-796.)
Specifically, Mr. Garcia’s sister noted that not only was her brother a very hard worker,
“great brother, son, cousin, friend, but he is an even better uncle.” (Sealed R., p.750.) Rosie
wrote:
My brother is the most amazing uncle to my three daughters. They all adore him,
and call him their favorite tio (uncle in Spanish). He was always the first to be at
their recitals, softball games, birthdays, and graduations. The girls would look
forward to their recitals because they know they would be receiving flowers from
their tio Jesus. He would always help me out with my daughters in any way he
could. If he would see me struggling at Christmas time he would give me the last
of his cash in his wallet. . . . He is super generous. He is that uncle who would go
beyond measures to spoil and love his nieces limitless[ly].
(Sealed R., p.750.)
His family also spoke to Mr. Garcia’s remorse. His “grandmother” noted that “I see the
pain in his eyes when I do the video visits with him, and I feel the hurt in his voice and heart for
the loss of another family’s member that was caused by him getting involved with . . . drugs.”
(Sealed R., p.759.) His cousin Alex Gallegos wrote that:
I have always felt that Jesus is very transparent; he wears his heart on his
sleeve and his care for others is obvious. I had the opportunity to speak with
Jesus immediately following the trial, and his remorse was evident. He is deeply
saddened by the tragic loss of life, and he regrets that there is little he can do to
heal the family’s pain. His acknowledgment of the pain felt by the grieved family
members reflected the true character of a person who knows that contrition is the
first step towards forgiveness.
(Sealed R., p.787.)
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As noted by his family, although Mr. Garcia has maintained that his actions were in selfdefense, he has expressed his remorse for his roles in the death of Mr. Ruiz-Gomez and the
injuries suffered by Mr. Rosales. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho
Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, “In light of Alberts’ expression of remorse for
his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive
attributes of his character.” Id. 121 Idaho at 209. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Garcia stated:
Your Honor, I’m in front of you today because of my involvement in the
events that occurred on January 13th and 14th of 2017. I understand that my role
in the events is the result of Daviel Ruiz Gomez’s death along with the injuries of
Luis Rosales.
I should have been more concerned about my choices that I was making
instead of disregarding them. I should have – I shouldn’t have been carrying a
pocket knife. I should have never been downtown Boise in a bar drinking and
doing drugs.
I never meant for any of this to happen. I never meant to hurt anyone that
bad, let alone take someone’s life away. I’m truly sorry for my actions and
involvement in all of this. If there’s any way I could take this all back and not let
this happen, I would. I want Daviel’s family, wife and friends to know that I’m
definitely sorry for their loss and I never meant to take his life away. I[’ll] make
sure to always keep him in my prayers. And as hard as it would be to even think
about it, I hope that one day they can forgive me.
I also want to apologize to Luis. I want you to know that I’m very sorry
for what I’ve done and I hope you forgive me one day as well. This is not who I
am and this does not define me as a person. I take full responsibility for my
actions and I am willing to accept the consequences.
I’m going to do anything and everything I possibly can to get the most out
of prison. Not only am I going to keep working on myself by changing the way I
think and the way I condone myself, I’m going to further my education as well. I
have learned and grown so much this past year from all of this. I’ve set personal
and life goals for myself that I really hope I get a chance to accomplish.
I understand that someone’s life was lost and that someone was hurt badly.
I have to live the rest of my life knowing that Daviel died because of my actions.
It is something I can’t take back and I’m going to have to face that every single
day.
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Your Honor, I'm deeply sorry for what I've done and I regret everything
that happened that night. I just really hope you give me a chance to show you as
well as every single person in this room that this is not who I am. I want to thank
you for your time and your consideration. I really appreciate it.
(Tr., p.1898, L.16 - p.1900, L.17.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing excessive sentences upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his substance abuse, need for treatment, mental health issues, friend and
family support, and remorse, it would have crafted less severe sentences.

V.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Garcia To Pay $162,185.27 In
Restitution
A.

Introduction
Mr. Garcia challenges the district court's restitution order for him to pay $162,185.27.

He asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider his current
and future inability to pay.

B.

Standard Of Review
"'The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the

district court's discretion,' guided by factors in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7)." State v. Hurles,
158 Idaho 569, 573 (2015) (quoting State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011)). Appellate
courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its discretion: Whether
the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
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specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Garcia To Pay Restitution In
Light Of His Current And Future Inability To Pay
"Idaho's restitution statute permits a court to order restitution for 'any crime which

results in an economic loss to the victim."'
5304(2)).

Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602 (quoting LC. § 19-

"In determining an amount for restitution, a court must consider a defendant's

indigency." State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 398 (Ct. App. 2012). "Idaho Code § 19-5304(7)
provides that a court "shall consider ... the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the
defendant." State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379 (Ct. App. 2004). A defendant's inability to pay
alone does not preclude or limit a restitution award, but it is a factor that the district court must
consider when "it makes a discretionary restitution determination." Id. The district court may
consider an indigent defendant's "future ability to pay," such as, for example, the defendant's
"business acumen to earn money for restitution upon his eventual release from prison." State v.
Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543 (Ct. App. 1989).

Here, Mr. Garcia contends that the district court failed to adequately consider his inability
to pay restitution.

Although the district court noted that it had considered Mr. Garcia's

"economic circumstances", it concluded "that an order of restitution is appropriate in this case."
(R., p.636.) Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion by giving little weight
to his current inability to pay and by expecting his future earning ability to improve. Mr. Garcia
has neither the present nor future ability to pay over $160,000.00 in restitution.
As shown by the pre sentence investigation, Mr. Garcia does not have the financial
resources or current earning ability to pay the full restitution amount. Mr. Garcia dropped out of
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high school in the 11th grade. (PSI, p.522.) Although in 2011, Mr. Garcia reported that he was
working on his GED, it appears that he has not obtained his GED. (PSI, pp.10-11, 914-973.)
Regardless, he has been able to obtain employment in the past. (Sealed R., p.719.) Prior to his
arrest he was in the process of returning to Heartland Recreational Vehicles, a business he had
worked for previously. (Sealed R., p.719.) However, it is unlikely that any position will be held
for him upon release.
Yet, the biggest concerns when evaluating Mr. Garcia’s ability to pay restitution are not
his lack of education or recent employment status. It is the fact that he has been sentenced to a
period of incarceration for at least 25 years and, possibly, for the remainder of his life. The
presentence investigator noted that Mr. Garcia’s “ability to comply with costs associated with
this case will likely depend on his length of incarceration and his ability to obtain and maintain
release from incarceration.” (PSI, p.5.) Unfortunately, it appears that his ability to pay is, and
will be, very low for the foreseeable future. Mr. Garcia will be nearly 50-years-old when he
eligible for parole. At this point, he will have no savings and will have been removed from the
workforce for over two decades. As such, his future earning ability is also extremely limited.
In light of Mr. Garcia’s situation, the district court should have exercised its discretion
and either significantly reduced the restitution amount or forgone restitution entirely.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that his convictions be vacated and his case remanded
for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it
deems appropriate.

Additionally, he requests that this Court vacate the district court's

restitution order and remand this case for further proceedings.
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